Testbeds Cannot be Foreign Assets

– By Srivatsa RV

As someone who has closely observed India’s aerospace journey, I feel increasingly uneasy about a critical capability we’ve repeatedly neglected, having our own flying testbed. For years now, we’ve depended entirely on foreign facilities to validate our jet engines and avionics, and it’s clearer today than ever before that this dependence is becoming a strategic liability.

Consider the ambitious projects we have ahead of us. The Advanced Medium Combat Aircraft (AMCA), the Light Combat Aircraft Mk2 (LCA Mk2), the Twin-Engine Deck-Based Fighter (TEDBF), and the Ghatak UCAV, all of these crucial programs rely heavily on our ability to develop and thoroughly test indigenous propulsion and avionics systems. Yet, in the absence of a domestic flying laboratory, we’re constantly at the mercy of foreign schedules, priorities, and constraints. This situation inevitably leads to delays, inflated costs, and compromises on sensitive data that India can no longer afford.

Rationale: Strategic Need for an Indigenous Flying Testbed

The absence of a domestic flying testbed has repeatedly exposed our hidden vulnerability, the Kaveri aero jet engine, developed by the Gas Turbine Research Establishment (GTRE), had no option but to undergo flight testing aboard a modified IL-76 at Russia’s Gromov Flight Research Institute (GFRI) in 2010. Although these trials provided essential data that qualified the Kaveri as an airworthy flying engine, the arrangements inevitably involved costs, delays, and uncertainties beyond our control. Recent tests of the Kaveri derivative for high-altitude performance in Russia have progressed at a frustratingly slow pace, largely because Russia has prioritized its domestic programs, such as testing the PD-8 engine for the Superjet airliner. The situation has further deteriorated due to disruptions caused by the ongoing conflict in Ukraine, complicating our efforts even more. This dependency severely limits India’s autonomy in aerospace research and further stretches already tight development timelines.

India’s military and industrial infrastructure already possesses the essential organizational backbone and skilled manpower to establish a domestic flying testbed. On the Indian Air Force side, the Aircraft Systems Testing Establishment (ASTE) is ready to handle systems and engine integration all the way upto test flying, supported by experienced test pilots familiar with transport aircraft and AWACS platforms. Meanwhile, GTRE, as the R&D lead, along with industry partners, would naturally oversee engine adaptation, fine-tuning, and testing aboard an IL-76. The flying testbed directly addresses one of three strategic gaps highlighted by the DRDO leadership, who emphasize that the development of aero-engines requires critical domestic facilities, specifically:

• High-Altitude Flying Test Facility (No such platform exists within India)
• Flying Test Bed (No such platform exists within India)
• 110-130 kN Class Engine Test Facility (Coming up in Rajankunte, Bengaluru)

The IL-76 fleet is a strategic asset to the IAF, but a considerably large one (total fleet strength is 17). Dedicating one airframe to testing (especially an older airframe or one due for rotation out of frontline service) would demonstrate IAF’s commitment to indigenization. This civil-military fusion in a flying lab environment will strengthen the overall aerospace ecosystem in India.

Technical and Structural Requirements for IL-76 Conversion

Converting an IL-76 into a flying testbed is an engineering-intensive but feasible undertaking. The aircraft is a large, four-engine jet with robust airframe capacity and substantial onboard power , attributes that make it well-suited for carrying test articles and instrumentation. International engine houses prefer four-engine platforms for testbeds because a test engine can replace one of the four, while the other three engines provide redundancy to keep the aircraft. The IL-76 matches this profile, Russians use the same, and companies like Pratt and Whitney and Rolls-Royce use Boeing 747s for engine testing.

The key structural changes would revolve around how the engine is mounted. One of the IL-76’s outboard engine pylons can be modified to carry the test engine in place of its standard D-30 turbofan. In the Kaveri tests at Gromov Institute, exactly this was done: “One of the aircraft’s four engines was replaced with the Kaveri engine,” requiring extensive airframe.

This was the configuration used during the Kaveri tests in Russia. The mounting point must be reinforced to handle new loads, thrust variations, weight and vibration offsets and possibly redesigned with modular adapters to support different engine sizes. This is seen with the Boeing 747-400 airframe testbeds that Pratt & Whitney and Rolls Royce operate with. The 747 platform can handle engines from 20 kN to 115 kN using universal mount points. Achieving similar flexibility for the IL-76 will require adjustable cowlings, exhaust interfaces, and center-of-gravity compensation when needed.

Beyond the physical mounting, systems integration is critical. The test engine must interface with the IL-76’s fuel supply, electrical power, and control systems. New piping and wiring will be required to route fuel to the pylon and to connect the engine’s electronic control unit. GTRE has already tested and validated the Advanced FADEC (Full Authority Digital Engine Control) system, which comprises an engine-mounted Digital Electronic Control Unit (DECU) with embedded control laws, engine fuel metering units, hydraulic actuation systems, engine sensors, and more. As a safety-critical system, A-FADEC incorporates multiple levels of redundancy in both electrical and hydraulic domains.

During the case of GRFI owned Russian IL-76 testbed, the Kaveri’s mechanical, electrical, and fuel systems were adapted into the host aircraft, and the engine’s operation was managed from the cockpit. We could mirror this by installing a dedicated engine throttle lever or console for the test engine, along with emergency shut-off and fire suppression tied into the IL-76’s systems. The aircraft’s instrumentation bus can be augmented to accept the test engine’s sensor data. In practice, the IL-76 will carry an extensive array of sensors on the test engine , measuring pressures, temperatures, vibrations, strains, fuel flows, etc.

A high-channel-count data acquisition system should be installed to record this data. (Modern testbeds like GE’s have on-board systems with hundreds of channels for steady-state and dynamic measurements, plus cameras and telemetry.The IL-76’s spacious airframe (originally a cargo/tanker) allows room to install racks of data acquisition computers, telemetry transmitters, and even a dedicated station for test engineers to monitor real-time parameters in-flight. Critically, a telemetry system will downlink data to a ground station so that engineers on the ground can observe the engine’s behavior live and advise the flight crew of any anomalies.

As noted in the Kaveri test campaign, performance data was recorded onboard and also relayed to ground in real-time back in 2010. This requires integration of a high-bandwidth radio or satellite link and likely a mission control room on the ground (similar to how test ranges monitor flights). The IL-76’s communications suite might need upgrades to handle this data flow securely.

While the primary intent of this testbed would be engine development, its utility need not stop there. Given the size, power, and structural flexibility of the IL-76 platform, it can just as effectively serve as a flying laboratory for a range of radar and sensor trials. For example, the nose cone could be modified to house fighter-grade AESA radars or compact surveillance arrays. Alternatively, a palletized radar setup could be positioned within the cargo bay, with the antenna extending through a custom opening or mounted in an underbelly pod. This modularity allows switching between different sensor configurations with minimal downtime.

There’s even potential to mount electro-optical payloads, electronic warfare suites, or UAV-grade systems on stub wings or external pylons. While large AWACS-class modifications like dorsal domes are more complex, they aren’t off the table for future planning. In essence, what starts as an engine testbed could evolve into a national flying laboratory, one that serves a wide spectrum of R&D programs across the services.

Power supply and cooling are also important considerations. A test engine may need its own startup power (APU or cross-bleed air supply) and might draw significant electrical power for its control systems or afterburner igniters , the IL-76’s generators must be checked for capacity, or an extra generator added. Similarly, testing a radar will require high-power electrical feeds and cooling air. The IL-76’s environmental control system might need augmentation (or a standalone cooling unit) to dissipate heat from onboard electronics during sensor trials.

Lastly, the conversion would include setting up a flight test instrumentation (FTI) suite across the aircraft, airdata booms, additional accelerometers and strain gauges on the wings and pylon (to measure the dynamic effect of the test engine), and possibly optical instruments (cameras) to observe the engine (for example, a high-speed camera trained on the engine exhaust or fan face to detect anomalies like flameouts). GE’s testbed, for instance, employs on-board cameras and even satellite links to observe test results. The Indian testbed should incorporate these best practices from day-1 for maximum mileage. All this additional hardware can be integrated without impeding the basic flying qualities of the IL-76. Overall, while the structural and system modifications are extensive, they are within the capabilities of modern aerospace engineering. India can leverage both its own institutions (e.g. HAL’s aircraft integration experience, NAL’s test instrumentation expertise) and international partners (the Ilyushin design bureau, which designed the IL-76/78, or private firms that specialize in testbed conversions) to execute this conversion with confidence.

Lessons from Past Indian Efforts and Historical Context

India so far has had to piggyback on foreign platforms for such capabilities. The GTRE Kaveri turbojet program offers a cautionary tale and learning experience. In the 2000s, as the Kaveri (GTX-35VS) engine for the Tejas fighter faced delays, GTRE turned to Russia’s Gromov Flight Research Institute (GFRI) for in-flight testing. With over 27 flights (57 hours), the IL-76 testbed carried the Kaveri to altitudes up to ~12 km and speeds of Mach 0.7. These tests demonstrated basic functionality , the engine could run in flight , but also revealed shortfalls (e.g. slightly lower thrust than expected, and higher weight). While the Kaveri did not meet all objectives to power the Tejas, the flight test campaign was invaluable. It provided tacit knowledge to Indian scientists on aero-engine behavior in flight, and confidence in the underlying technology. Notably, it proved that India could design an engine that would start, operate and be controllable in mid-air , a non-trivial achievement for a first-timer. This was achieved without having an indigenous testbed. However, it required complex logistics of sending engines and personnel to Russia and coordinating test windows at GFRI. A feat that deserves the appreciation in itself.

As of 2025, history is repeating, GTRE’s new Kaveri Derivative Engine (KDE) , a dry variant around 48 kN class thrust for the Ghatak UCAV , has been cleared for flight testing and once again has to rely on Russia’s IL-76 testbed. A 70-hour test campaign was scheduled for early 2025 on the GFRI IL-76 modified for this purposes. However Indian officials acknowledge that using the Russian platform, while helpful, comes with inherent delays and constraints (Russia’s test fleet is busy with its own PD-8 and other engine tests). Furthermore, there are cost implications each time , India effectively “leases” the testbed time. In addition to costs, there is limited flexibility to extend or modify test plans on the fly, since the asset is not under our full control.

It is worth noting that India has attempted flying testbeds for radar systems in the past. In the 1990s, the DRDO’s Airborne Surveillance Platform (ASP) project (Project “Airawat”) fitted a Hawker HS-748 turboprop aircraft with a rotodome-mounted surveillance radar to develop an indigenous AWACS capability. Two prototype aircraft were flown for several years to validate the radar concept, essentially serving as sensor testbeds. Unfortunately, a tragic crash in 1999 of one HS-748 testbed halted things in track. Nonetheless, that experience demonstrated DRDO’s ability to integrate and flight-test a complex sensor suite on a surrogate aircraft.

More recently in the post 2010 era, for the indigenous AEW&C system (Netra), DRDO conducted extensive flight trials of its radar and mission system on modified Embraer EMB-145 jets. These examples underscore a consistent theme, when India invests in a dedicated test platform, whether for engines or sensors, it reaps significant R&D benefits , but lack of a permanent, owned platform makes each effort ad-hoc and dependent on available resources or foreign help.

The takeaway from historical attempts is clear. Firstly, Indian engineers and test crews have the competency to undertake flight testing of advanced systems (be it engines or radars) , the limiting factor is the availability of a suitable aircraft and infrastructure. Second, each time we have had to approach the problem, we started from scratch or relied on external assistance, which is inefficient. Establishing a permanent flying testbed would institutionalize this capability. All the know-how gained from the Kaveri’s foreign test flights and the sensor testbed projects can be consolidated into the IL-76 FTB program. This continuity would help preserve expert knowledge, develop standard operating procedures, and create a standing team of test pilots and engineers specialized in such trials. In essence, India has dabbled in flying testbeds out of necessity, now it must commit to having one indigenously to support all future programs consistently.

Aerial Engine Testing and Certification in the Indian Context (CEMILAC Perspective)

Any new aircraft engine, especially for military use, must clear a rigorous certification process before it can be deemed airworthy and fit for service. In India, the Centre for Military Airworthiness and Certification (CEMILAC) is the authority that oversees this process for defence aerospace systems. CEMILAC’s philosophy is grounded in ensuring safety and reliability through a step-by-step expansion of the engine’s operational envelope, from ground to air.

Typically, a new turbojet or turbofan engine undergoes extensive ground testing, including bench runs, endurance cycles, and trials in Altitude Test Facilities (ATFs) that simulate high-altitude conditions like low pressure and cold temperatures. GTRE, for instance, has previously utilized the Russian Central Institute of Aviation Motors (CIAM) altitude chamber for such tests, a facility India currently lacks. However, even the most advanced ground or simulated altitude testing has its limits. Before an engine can be certified to power an actual aircraft with a pilot onboard, it must prove stable and reliable performance in real flight conditions. This is where a flying testbed becomes indispensable in the certification chain.

CEMILAC regulations require that the engine demonstrate its performance across a range of conditions:

• Performance at various altitudes and airspeeds,
• Rapid throttle transients,
• Engine restarts mid-air,
• Extreme manoeuvres (within reason),
• and Environmental conditions (hot weather, cold weather, etc.).

A controlled testbed aircraft allows these scenarios to be tested one by one, with safety nets in place. Importantly, all these test points generate data to verify that the engine meets its design specifications and the Air Staff Requirements (ASR) set by the Indian Air Force. If there are discrepancies , e.g, thrust shortfall or fuel consumption higher than predicted , those must be analyzed and potentially corrected before final clearance.

The philosophy of aerial testing can be summed up as: “Test what you can on the ground, but prove it in the air.”

Flight testing an engine in an FTB is essentially the capstone in the development phase where engineers confirm in the sky what was promised on paper and observed in ground labs. In practice, CEMILAC officials or representatives are involved in reviewing the test plans and results. They will stipulate certain tests (for example, in-flight shutdown and restart of the engine at a high altitude, to simulate flameout recovery scenarios) that must be passed. Using a flying testbed, these can be done relatively safely: the test engine can be shut down in flight and then restarted, while the host aircraft still has three other engines running to maintain flight , a critical safety advantage. Data from such tests , captured via sensors and telemetry , is scrutinized to ensure parameters like turbine temperatures, vibration levels, etc, stayed within limits during these events.

Furthermore, aerial testing under CEMILAC will examine how the engine interacts with aircraft systems, for instance, does the engine’s bleed air extraction or power off-take affect the host aircraft in unexpected ways, does the FADEC respond correctly to pilot inputs in dynamic conditions, are there any unforeseen aerodynamic effects (like inlet distortion issues or exhaust plume impingement) when mounted on an aircraft? The testbed again, can help answer all these questions for a new engine before that engine is ever installed on a frontline fighter or UCAV. This de-risks the integration phase on the actual target platform (like Tejas or AMCA), because CEMILAC will already have confidence that the engine behaves well in flight.

It’s also worth noting that CEMILAC’s mandate includes certifying the flying testbed aircraft itself for experimental flying. The IL-76, once modified, will effectively become a one-of-a-kind “experimental” aircraft with unique characteristics (as it carries prototype engines or equipment). CEMILAC, along with IAF’s Aircraft & Systems Testing Establishment (ASTE), would evaluate the modified aircraft for basic airworthiness , e.g, ensuring the airframe can handle the asymmetrical thrust of a test engine if it produces more/less thrust than the standard engines, that the structure can bear the loads of the new pylon, and that failure of the test engine (like a turbine blade failure) will not catastrophically damage the host aircraft. Only after such evaluations would CEMILAC clear the testbed to conduct flights with a given test article.

In summary, within the Indian certification framework, a flying testbed will be an essential tool to satisfy the “fly-before-you-fly” requirement. It ensures adherence to safety and performance standards in a stepwise fashion. The presence of an Indian-owned FTB would also simplify compliance with CEMILAC’s requirements, our certifiers can directly observe tests and even tailor them to specific concerns, rather than relying on reports from abroad. It makes the certification process more responsive and under national oversight. Given that future programs like the AMCA’s engine will likely involve partnerships (e.g, with Safran or Rolls Royce), having our own testbed can also be a negotiating asset , we can offer to share testing burdens or validate changes in-country, keeping critical learning within India. CEMILAC, for its part, would likely welcome such a capability, as it streamlines the path to certifying the end products that they and the Services eagerly await.

Key Challenges and Considerations

Implementing an IL-76 flying testbed is a complex endeavor that will encounter several challenges. Policymakers must anticipate these and plan mitigation strategies. Here are some details on the main categories of challenges , technical and regulatory , and discuss how to address them:

1. Technical Complexity & Engineering Challenges:

• Modifying a large aircraft for experimental use is a non-trivial engineering project. One challenge is ensuring the structural integrity of the modified wing/pylon. The IL-76’s wing was not originally designed to carry engines other than its specified ones, a different engine could impose different stresses (e.g. heavier weight, different thrust line, more vibration). There’s a risk of structural fatigue or even failure if not properly reinforced.
• A detailed structural analysis (with Ilyushin design bureau support or using HAL’s airframe experts) should be conducted. Likely, reinforcement plates or struts will be added inside the wing. Finite element modelling can predict load paths and ensure the modified design has adequate safety margins. Ground vibration tests and static load tests on the pylon might be done before first flight. Another technical challenge is aerodynamic and control stability , flying with one odd engine (possibly producing asymmetrical thrust or drag) could affect handling. If the test engine has much lower thrust, the aircraft might yaw unless other engines compensate; if it has higher thrust, controlling that asymmetry is critical.
• Test pilots and engineers can develop procedures to manage thrust asymmetry (for instance, limiting the test engine to certain power levels in flight if needed, or programming an automatic thrust offset in opposite wing engines). Wind-tunnel or CFD studies of the engine/pylon shape may be needed to ensure no nasty airflow issues (like the test engine’s exhaust interfering with the tail or excessive turbulence). The IL-76’s control systems (being analog/older design) lack modern fly-by-wire auto-compensation, so this relies on pilot skill and possibly minor tweaks.
• There’s also the challenge of integrating disparate systems , making a Soviet-designed airframe work with possibly Western and Indian sensors along with an Indian experimental engine. Compatibility of electrical power (different voltages/frequencies), data protocols, etc can be an issue.
• For example, if the test engine’s electronics run on 115V AC 400Hz (Western standard) but IL-76 supplies 36V DC (Russian standard for instruments), then converters must be installed. Similarly, hydraulic or pneumatic interfaces might need custom solutions (the IL-76 has pneumatic starters for engines, while our Kaveri engine might need electric start).
• Perhaps the most unpredictable challenge is the behavior of the prototype engine or system itself. These are, by definition, not fully proven. An engine could suffer flameout, a turbine failure, or other malfunction while airborne. A sensor under test could malfunction and create electrical issues on the plane. Mitigation with extensive ground testing is the first defence , only take airborne those units that have passed rigorous bench tests.
• Even then, the testbed must be fitted with safety measures: e.g, a fire containment and extinguishing system around the test engine in case it catches fire (the IL-76 likely already has engine fire suppression, but it may need augmentation for a different engine bay). The fuel flow to the test engine should have quick shutoff valves. Possibly, some form of engine jettison system could be studied (though typically not implemented due to complexity , most testbeds do not jettison engines, they rely on shutting down and returning to base on remaining engines).
• For sensor tests, ensuring electrical isolation of the test equipment from the aircraft’s critical systems (so a short-circuit in experimental gear doesn’t knock out the aircraft’s avionics) is important. The test team should have clear contingency plans, if the test engine behaves unexpectedly, cut it off and land if telemetry shows an anomaly, terminate the test point, etc. This disciplined approach is standard in flight test programs.

2. Regulatory and Administrative Challenges:

• Even though this is a military program, there are still regulatory hoops. CEMILAC, as discussed, will have to certify both the modified aircraft and each test plan. Engaging CEMILAC early and often is important , their input might affect design decisions (they may insist on certain safety factors or backup systems, for example). While CEMILAC is under DRDO (same as GTRE), in practice it maintains an independent stance on safety.
• So, expect an iterative process of reviews, which can introduce bureaucratic delays. One way to mitigate this early on is to form a joint working group that includes CEMILAC and DGAQA reps in the project team from day one, so that their concerns are addressed in design rather than after-the-fact.
• If any foreign technology or collaboration is involved (say we get technical assistance from Ilyushin or a Western instrumentation vendor), then export control and security issues come in. Care must be taken that no classified Indian technology (like specifics of the engine parameters under test) is inadvertently shared with foreign partners helping on the aircraft side. Non-disclosure agreements and clear task boundaries (foreign help only on aircraft structural aspects, for example) might be required.
• Not many realize that the Chinese WS-20 engine was also tested in GFRI on the same IL-76 LL flying testbed used for the Kaveri. This underscores why India cannot afford to remain dependent on foreign platforms for validating its future aerospace projects.

3. Safety and Risk Management:

• Flight testing is inherently risky, and doing it in a large aircraft with unproven engines or gear raises the stakes (both in terms of lives and a valuable asset at risk). A major challenge will be instilling a culture of safety and discipline in the program as this will involve a military and research lab collaboration, with one of them having seem more aerospace safety than other, onus would lie on the ASTE to instruct safely over what is possible. This includes following strict test protocols, being ready to abort tests at the slightest sign of trouble, and thoroughly investigating and learning from any anomalies.
• The memory of the 1999 HS-748 testbed crash, which killed several top scientists, looms as a reminder that mistakes in flight test can be fatal and set a program back by years. The project must have robust safety reviews. ASTE and veteran test pilots should be empowered to veto any test points they deem too risky.

4. Public Perception and Continuity:

• While not a technical challenge, it’s worth noting the need to manage expectations and perception. The success of this project will depend on sustained support. If the first tests reveal major engine problems (which is possible , that’s the point of testing, to find problems), it should not be viewed as a failure of the testbed concept, but rather as a success of catching issues early.
• Policymakers and the public should be made aware that a flying testbed will likely encounter engine shutdowns, perhaps even engine damage, and that is normal in the course of pushing the envelope , it’s far better than such failures happening in an operational squadron. So a challenge is to educate stakeholders that this is high-risk testing by design.
• A strong outreach and communication strategy should be in place, highlighting incremental successes (for instance, “today the indigenous engine achieved stable operation at 40,000 ft on the testbed , a first for India”) to build confidence and patience.

Project Management – The Silent Challenge in Indian Defence Landscape

This project sits at the intersection of IAF (which owns the aircraft and pilots), DRDO (which develops engines/sensors and will conduct tests), HAL or industry (which might do the modifications). Clear leadership and roles must be established. A few established questions that are a no-brainer are given below,

• Who “owns” the testbed aircraft once converted , IAF’s Flight Test Squadron or a DRDO unit?
• If it’s IAF, will they allocate pilots full-time and allow the plane to be used purely for R&D flights?
• If DRDO, do they have the competency to maintain and operate a big jet (likely not, so IAF’s Air HQ and maintenance command must be intimately involved)?

These administrative decisions can make or break the project. To account for this early on, the best approach may be a joint IAF-DRDO project office. This could be modelled akin to the National Flight Test Centre (NFTC) that handles Tejas testing with both ADA (DRDO) and IAF personnel. A memorandum of understanding can spell out resource sharing: IAF provides the airframe, aircrew, base support while DRDO provides modification design, instrumentation, and mission equipment. Both share the operational scheduling according to test priorities.

In summary, while the challenges are significant, none are insurmountable. Technical risks can be engineered out or contained with careful design and thorough testing on ground. Financial costs, while high, are justified by long-term gains and can be managed through phased funding. Regulatory and coordination issues can be solved by proactive joint management and early involvement of all players. The key is to approach the IL-76 testbed not as a rush job, but as a strategic project with proper systems engineering and project governance. Other countries have navigated these challenges , perhaps the final reassurance is that India can tap into global expertise. For instance, if needed, we could hire consultants who worked on Boeing or Ilyushin testbeds, or collaborate with a nation like France (Safran) that have an interest in India’s engine development. By foreseeing challenges and addressing them methodically, the program can avoid pitfalls and achieve its objectives.

International Case Studies and Best Practices

India would not be alone in operating a flying testbed , globally, several major aerospace players maintain dedicated test aircraft for engines and systems. These case studies provide proof of concept and valuable design philosophies that India can emulate:

Russia (Gromov Flight Research Institute, Zhukovsky)

• Russia’s GFRI is renowned for its fleet of flying laboratories. The IL-76LL (LL meaning “Letayuschchaya Laboratoriya” or Flying Lab) has been a workhorse for Soviet/Russian engine development. The Aviadvigatel PD-14 turbofan (for the Irkut MC-21 airliner) was tested on an IL-76LL, as is the newer PD-8 engine.
• The same IL-76LL was hired by India for Kaveri tests, demonstrating its versatility. Typically, the Russian approach involves mounting the prototype engine on an inner pylon of the IL-76, with extensive instrumentation.
• GFRI’s experience shows the importance of a robust data collection and analysis setup. They also exemplify safety practices, only very mature designs are tested in flight, and even then numerous precautionary ground runs and taxi tests are done beforehand. Russia has also historically used other platforms , e.g, a Tu-16 bomber was once used as a testbed, and a Tu-134 was outfitted to test the Soviet AWACS radar , but the IL-76 remains the prime example relevant to India’s IL-76 plan.
• The lesson from GFRI is the value of having a permanent institution for flight testing , their staff, aircraft, and instrumentation are always at the ready, allowing Russia to concurrently test multiple engines (as is happening now with PD-8, PD-14, etc.). India could consider establishing a similar permanent flight test unit around the IL-76 FTB, possibly under ASTE or a DRDO Flight Science Lab. (DRDO-FSL). We coined it here!

United States (USAF/NASA and Industry)

• General Electric (GE) – operates a Boeing 747-400 flying testbed (registration N747GF) out of Victorville, CA. This aircraft (acquired from Japan Airlines in 2010) replaced an older 747-100 (N747GE) that served GE since the 1990s. GE’s testbed has evaluated engines like the GE90, GEnx, and the massive GE9X for the latest 777X, as well as smaller engines. They mount the test engine on the left inboard wing station (after removing the standard engine there). The GE test program for the GE9X, for example, involved 48 flights and 217 hours over 5 months on the 747.
• GE’s approach emphasizes having a highly instrumented aircraft, their 747 is fitted with “on-board data systems, cameras, satellite downlinks” and even special equipment like electrical load banks to simulate aircraft power draw. A full engineering team flies aboard to monitor the engine in real-time.
• Pratt & Whitney (P&W) – similarly, has used a Boeing 747SP as a testbed (e.g, to test the PW1100G Geared Turbofan). And Rolls-Royce uses a Boeing 747-200 based in Arizona as its test platform , famously flying one of its Trent or Pearl series engines on an outboard pylon, making for a “five-engined” 747. Rolls’s 747 has tested engines for Airbus A350 (Trent XWB) and the latest business jet engines (Pearl 700, Pearl 10X). These industry testbeds underscore the importance of adaptability, they often feature quick-change engine mounts and versatile data acquisition to handle different test projects back-to-back.
• USAF & NASA –The U.S. Air Force does not maintain a dedicated engine testbed in the same way (they rely on industry for propulsion testing), but they have used surrogate aircraft for avionics and other systems. A notable example is the “CATBird”, a highly modified Boeing 737-300 operated by Lockheed Martin/USAF as the Cooperative Avionics Test Bed for the F-35 program. CATBird was outfitted with the entire suite of F-35 sensors and mission systems inside a 737, including a nose-mounted APG-81 AESA radar, to test and validate the fighter’s systems in the air without endangering a prototype. This is a case study in radar/sensor test bedding, India could do something analogous by installing, say, an Uttam AESA radar or a future AWACS array on the IL-76 to prove it out before final integration.

United Kingdom (Rolls-Royce)

• Rolls-Royce’s dedicated flying testbed program is instructive, especially on the financial and strategic commitment. Rolls Royce has used a 747-200 for many years, but in 2019 it set out to acquire an ex-Qantas 747-400 ((VH-OJU) to be converted into an even more advanced “flying digital hub” testbed. The plan was to invest $70 million for the acquisition and conversion of this aircraft, including high-end instrumentation upgrades. This indicates the scale of investment considered worthwhile for a cutting-edge testbed. (The project was later shelved due to the pandemic downturn, with Rolls opting to continue with the older 747-200 testbed and Rolls Royce opening Testbed-80, their premier engine test facility).
• While this new plan might have not gone ahead, the Rolls Royce initiative highlighted a couple of points. Firstly, a modern testbed can double as a data center in the sky, capturing massive data for analytics (hence “digital hub”) , a direction India could move towards by integrating modern data logging and telemetry in the IL-76. Secondly, even private industry sees value in owning multiple testbeds to increase testing capacity, which shows how demand for such platforms can grow with ambitious R&D programs.

Other Examples

• Several other entities operate flying testbeds for specialized purposes. Honeywell has a Boeing 757 that it uses as a flying laboratory to test avionics and smaller turbine engines (often seen with an extra engine mounted on its forward fuselage).
• Japan’s IHI Corporation in the past tested engines on a modified NAMC YS-11 turboprop.
• Even China is reportedly modifying one of its aircraft (possibly a variant of the Y-20 or a retired airliner) as an engine testbed as it develops indigenous jet engines.

Each of these examples reinforces the notion that a country serious about developing engines will invest in a flying test platform. It reduces risk and speeds up innovation. They also show that the platform need not be extremely new , e.g GE’s original 747 testbed was nearly 50 years old, Honeywell’s 757 is 40 years old , what matters is that it’s well-maintained and appropriately modified.

For Indian defence policymakers, these case studies offer both encouragement and caution. The encouraging part is that there is a well-trodden path technically , we can draw on designs and methodologies from those who have done it (perhaps even collaborate or get consulting support for initial setup). The cautionary part is that establishing and running a testbed is a long-term commitment. Just as Russia or GE have kept their platforms in service for decades, India will need to plan to do the same. Consistent funding, upkeep, and a pipeline of test projects will be necessary to justify and sustain the capability. The worst outcome would be to convert an IL-76 at great expense, use it for one campaign, and then let it languish. Thus, learning from international peers, we should plan the IL-76 testbed as a continuously utilized national asset, serving not just one program but a succession of engines and avionics programs over the next 20+ years at least.

Imagining the Future: Scenarios and Benefits

How exactly would an IL-76 flying testbed be used in practice? This section outlines realistic scenarios and the expected benefits in each case, illustrating the transformative impact such a platform could have on India’s aerospace development timeline:

Opportunity 1: Accelerating a Fighter Engine Development (AMCA Engine)

• Imagine circa 2028, a prototype 110 kN thrust turbofan intended for the Advanced Medium Combat Aircraft is ready for flight trials. With an IL-76 testbed available, the engine can be mounted and flown at incremental power settings while AMCA prototypes are still on the ground. The testbed conducts a series of flights expanding the engine’s envelope , starting with low-altitude, low-speed runs and progressing to transonic speeds at 40,000+ feet.
• Engineers gather performance data (thrust, fuel consumption, compressor stability margins) in actual flight conditions, which feeds back into design tweaks. They could also deliberately induce stress tests, throttle slams, windmill restarts, and even shutting the engine off in mid-air to test relight capability. All the while, the IL-76’s other three engines keep the flight safe in case the new engine hiccups.
• Over, say, 50-100 hours of flight test spread across a year, the engine’s design is validated and any issues (e.g, a compressor surge tendency at a certain altitude) are discovered and fixed before integrating into the AMCA. When the prototype finally flies, it can do so with a near fully-proven indigenous engine, greatly increasing the chances of success on first attempt. This could compress the timeline for induction , what might have taken, hypothetically, an extra 2-3 years of sorting out engine bugs in the prototype phase can be shaved off, because many bugs were ironed out on the testbed earlier. In essence, the engine development runs in parallel to aircraft development, not sequentially, saving calendar time.

Scenario 2: Validation of a Kaveri Derivative for UAVs

• The IAF is interested in a higher thrust non-afterburning turbofan for a future UCAV or a medium-weight fighter-trainer. GTRE goes ahead and develops “Kaveri 2.0” aiming for ~70-75 kN dry thrust. Ground tests are passed, and now the engine must prove itself in flight. The IL-76 testbed is fitted with this new engine. Because this engine lacks an afterburner (and thus might produce less thrust than the IL-76’s stock engines), the flight profile is adjusted , the testbed might take off using its three standard engines plus partial thrust from the new engine, then the new engine is throttled up to test points once at altitude.
• The campaign might include long-endurance runs (to test reliability , e.g, a 3- hour continuous operation at cruise), high-power climbs (to see how the engine handles thermal stresses), and engine air-starts (shutting down and re-starting at high altitude to simulate a UAV engine flameout recovery). Telemetry is streaming data to ground at GTRE’s telemetry room in Bangalore and other facilities if need be.
• Over multiple flights, the new engine’s fuel control is fine-tuned based on real atmospheric behavior, and its lubrication system is observed under zero-G maneuvers that only a real flight provides. By the end of these trials, the engine can attain initial clearance from CEMILAC for use in a UAV with confidence that it won’t quit in mid-mission. Also, any minor redesigns (say a better oil pump needed for high-altitude lubrication) can be implemented before going into production. The overall timeline to field this engine is tightened, and the risk of costly failures in deployed UAVs is reduced. For the IAF, this means indigenous UAVs can be powered by indigenous engines sooner, enhancing self-reliance in propulsion for drones as well.

Scenario 3: Testing a New Radar or Sensor Suite

• Traditionally, this role has been carried out by the Indian test aircraft “Virupaksha”, but for the scenario led analysis, we will lay this out clearly. Consider DRDO developing a next-generation airborne AESA radar intended for a future AWACS platform or a large-area ground mapping radar for surveillance. Instead of waiting to integrate this radar onto a costly new aircraft directly, they mount it on the IL-76 testbed. For example, a prototype AWACS radar array (which might be a rotodome or a fixed array) could be installed on the fuselage of the IL-76.
• The testbed, outfitted with the radar’s signal processors and mission system consoles in the cabin, then flies representative operational patterns , orbiting over a test range to detect fighter aircraft or track vehicles on the ground. During these flights, sensor performance is evaluated: detection range, tracking stability, multi-target capacity, and resilience to jamming (perhaps another IAF aircraft acts as a “red team” jammer).
• Similarly, an electro-optical/infrared sensor turret (for, say, a targeting pod or a long-range IRST) could be mounted on the IL-76’s belly and flight-tested day and night against various targets to validate algorithms. The sensor developers get early feedback under real flight conditions , e.g, how the radar’s beam behaves with platform vibrations, or how the IR sensor’s image quality is affected by the aircraft’s own heat and altitude.

Scenario 4: Ongoing Refinements and Upgrades

• The utility of a flying testbed doesn’t end with testing brand-new systems, it can be used to continuously improve existing ones. Suppose the indigenous AMCA engine is in service by 2035, but an upgrade is envisioned with better fuel efficiency or higher thrust. Rather than pulling operational fighters out of service for experimental engines, the upgrade can be tested on the IL-76 first. The same goes for iterative improvements in radars (new software modes, for instance) or integration of new weapons/sensors (like a new kind of air-launched drone interface that needs an airborne trial).
• The FTB becomes a standing “flying laboratory” for the IAF and DRDO. It can take on projects like testing an advanced electronic warfare suite by installing it in the testbed and simulating combat scenarios, or trialing a high-speed data link by linking the testbed with ground stations and fighters during flight. This continuous use will help future-proof India’s aerospace development , we will always have a means to test in the air any critical technology that comes along.

Across all these scenarios, certain common benefits emerge:

• Risk Reduction: By the time an engine or sensor reaches an operational platform, most technical risks have been retired on the testbed. This increases safety (no unproven engine on a single-engine fighter, for example) and avoids costly retrofits after induction.
• Time Savings: Parallel development and testing can take years off program schedules, as highlighted. This is crucial given the rapid advancements and the IAF’s needs , delays of years can mean obsolescence or capability gaps.
• Cost Savings in the Long Run: While building a testbed is expensive, each day of testing on it can prevent failures that might cost far more (in accident losses or in having to redesign something post-deployment). Also, using one testbed for multiple projects is more economical than each project arranging its own separate flight trials infrastructure.
• Human Resource Development: Operating the testbed will train a cadre of Indian test pilots, flight test engineers, and scientists in the niche art of flight experimentation. These people become force-multipliers, bringing know-how into other projects (including purely domestic fighter test programs, etc.). It’s building intellectual infrastructure, not just physical.
• Indigenous Momentum: Success breeds success , when the IAF and DRDO start clocking victories (like an indigenous engine hitting performance targets or a homegrown radar matching imported ones) thanks in part to robust testing, it boosts confidence to take on even more challenging projects (like say a 6th-generation adaptive cycle engine down the line). It also signals to the world that India has come of age in aerospace R&D, which can have spin-off benefits like attracting talent and even offering testbed services to friendly nations in the future.

In short, the IL-76 testbed would be a constantly utilized asset, earning its keep through diverse deployments. Its multi-role flexibility , testing engines one month, radars the next, training test crews in between , makes it akin to a national laboratory in the sky. The payoff is not just the individual tests, but the cumulative uplift of India’s ability to design, test, and induct cutting-edge technology on its own terms.

Cost Estimate and Funding Strategy

How much will it cost? This is a pivotal question for decision-makers. While precise figures depend on scope and execution model, insights from similar global initiatives allow us to define a credible range. If you want to read about the progress Kaveri engine has made from its 2011 CAG audit remarks, read my previously written article here. (GTRE Kaveri Engine – Progess from 2011 CAG Report)

India’s plan should revolve on modifying an existing IL-76 from the IAF fleet, avoiding the expense of acquiring a new testbed aircraft. However, this does not mean cost-free access. Aircraft refurbishment, life-extension work, and adaptation for flight testing will still involve substantial effort.

The conversion will require:

• Structural reinforcement and pylon adaptation for engine integration.
• Systems integration for fuel lines, FADEC, power and control links.
• Advanced instrumentation suites like telemetry, sensors, and data acquisition systems.
• Ground-based telemetry stations and mission control capability.
• A multiyear engineering effort involving HAL, NAL, GTRE, and possibly Ilyushin.

Factoring all this, a one-time establishment cost in the range of 500-700 crores over 3-5 years implementation period is realistic. This aligns with the Rolls-Royce benchmark from their 2021 plan to convert a Boeing 747 into a dedicated flying testbed at a cost of ~$70 million (source: FlightGlobal).

Post-conversion, the testbed would incur annual operating expenses for crew, fuel, maintenance, and upgrades. While operating a large four-engine jet like the IL-76 is not cheap, the annual recurring cost is modest compared to the value it provides. These running expenses would scale based on flight tempo and usage.

In planning funding, a phased approach is prudent, the phasing helps spread out the cost over multiple financial years, making it more palatable. Also, some costs might be shared with specific programs. For example, if the AMCA engine project is sanctioned, a portion of its budget could be earmarked to utilize the testbed. In such a scenario, one could argue the testbed “pays for itself” by serving multiple projects which would have individually spent funds on alternative testing solutions.

One must also consider the cost of not doing it, continuing to rely on foreign test facilities means continuously paying them (draining foreign exchange), and possibly suffering delays (which have their own cost , delayed induction of critical technology can have national security costs that aren’t easily quantified in rupees). In the worst case, if geopolitical situations shift, access to foreign testbeds could be denied entirely, which would leave indigenous engine projects stranded mid-way. That risk avoidance itself justifies the investment.

In conclusion, while investments that are north of ₹500 crore are significant, they should be viewed as a strategic investment spread over decades of use. The funding strategy should tap into R&D allocations (the DRDO/GTRE budget for engine development, which is already being increased for the 110 kN engine project) and possibly capital procurement budget for the modification aspects (since modifying an aircraft could be considered a capital asset creation). Additionally, creative use of offsets , for example, if India is buying engines or aircraft from abroad, we could require the OEM to assist in our testbed development as part of offset commitments (imagine, Safran or GE providing some instrumentation or technical assistance as part of offsets for engine deals). Such ideas could alleviate direct costs.

Ultimately, the cost must be weighed against the strategic imperative , and in that light, it appears justified and even overdue. One major past mistake was under-investing in test infrastructure. Funding an IL-76 testbed project corrects that course.

Conclusion and Recommendations

Converting an IL-76 tanker into a state-of-the-art flying testbed for aero-engine and sensor development is an ambitious endeavor, but one that promises to dramatically strengthen India’s defence technological base. It is a project that embodies foresight , an investment now that will yield self-reliance dividends for decades, enabling indigenous fighters, UAVs, and surveillance platforms to be powered and equipped with home-grown systems that are fully tested and certified in India. The analysis above has made the case that the benefits far outweigh the costs and challenges. It has also highlighted that while challenges exist, they are manageable with prudent planning and collaboration.

From a policy perspective, the insight of an aerospace strategist is clear: if India wishes to be counted among the top aviation powers, it must possess the full ecosystem capable of sustaining the Design, Test, Certify and Fly cycle. A flying testbed is the keystone of that arch which has hitherto been missing. Its absence has been a strategic vulnerability, and its creation will be a strategic enabler. To that end, we conclude with a structured set of action items to materialize this project. These recommendations are addressed to the Ministry of Defence, Air HQ, DRDO, and all stakeholders in India’s aerospace community:

By executing the above steps, India can realistically have an operational flying testbed within the second half of this decade. The recommendation is to start now , each year of delay is a year in which our indigenous engine projects remain at the mercy of external factors. The IL-76 testbed project exemplifies a high-impact, strategic initiative that will bolster India’s defence readiness and technological autonomy. It is a bold move, certainly, but as this advisory has argued, it is both necessary and feasible. With careful planning and unwavering commitment, the Indian Air Force , in partnership with DRDO and industry , can soon join the elite club of nations that fly their own engine testbeds. This will be a tangible leap toward the oft-stated goal of self-reliance in defence aerospace and a proud milestone in India’s journey from being a technology importer to becoming a technology creator for the world.