Taiwan: China’s Unfinished Quest

By Riya Karan

Why can China, an economy of about $20.8 trillion, not take an island whose economy is roughly 21 times smaller ($976.72 billion)? The answer lies in geography, demography and economics, and in how each one ties Beijing’s hands while protecting Taipei.

Geography decides more than settlement

Humans are prisoners of geography. Since the Neolithic age we have ploughed, built homes and set up trade centres wherever the land allowed. But geography does more than decide where people settle: it shapes wars, draws political boundaries, and fixes a nation’s economic influence and strategic position.

This article asks why being an island is a safe haven for Taiwan and a nightmare for China, and which factors keep Taiwan from becoming a colony.

How the rivalry began

To understand any present-day conflict, we must look at its history. In the Chinese Civil War, the nationalists under Chiang Kai-shek fought the communists under Mao Zedong. The nationalists favoured a constitutional republic; the communists wanted one-party rule and a socialist state as the path to communism. The nationalists lost and fled to Taiwan in 1949, where they ran an authoritarian state until Taiwan held its first direct presidential election in 1996.

Both sides have since flourished in their own ways. So why does China remain fixated on Taiwan and keep firing warning shots? The reason is the CCP’s doctrine of the Great Rejuvenation of the Chinese Nation by 2049, meant to undo the “century of humiliation”. In Xi Jinping’s words, that rejuvenation is incomplete without unification with Taiwan.

A framework: Kjellén’s five politiks

Rudolf Kjellén, the Swedish political scientist who coined the term “geopolitics”, set out to understand what makes a state powerful. Building on the organic state theory of Friedrich Ratzel, he identified five factors in his book Staten som livsform (The State as a Life Form):

  1. Geopolitik: how geography shapes politics.
  2. Ekopolitik: how the state works as an economic force.
  3. Demopolitik: the impact of the population’s ethnic and racial composition.
  4. Sociopolitik: social cohesion and class structure.
  5. Kratopolitik: the legal and administrative structure of the state.

Modern thinkers fold all of these into “geopolitics”, but it is only one branch of Kjellén’s larger tree. We will use his lens to explain China’s struggle over Taiwan. The obstacles are geographical first, then demographic, economic and a matter of experience.

Geopolitik: the strait, the weather and the coast

The strait. The Taiwan Strait is about 130 km wide. With water on every side, China must attempt an amphibious landing, in the manner of Normandy.

No time to hide. The Allies spent roughly two years planning and preparing for Normandy. In the age of satellites, China has no such luxury. Moving amphibious brigades to Fujian, Zhejiang and other coastal provinces would alert the US and the wider world within hours. Taiwan and its allies would know almost at once, and the cost of that exposure is too high even for a manufacturing superpower.

The weather. The strait suffers monsoons, typhoons, fog and sea storms. April and October are the safest months, but storms do not follow the calendar, and an amphibious assault needs 7 to 10 days of clear weather. Landings come in waves: the first wave goes in, then later waves bring more troops, arms, ammunition and rations. A broken weather window breaks the supply chain.

Air power. The Allies at Normandy had air superiority, which any amphibious operation depends on. China’s air power is not yet matched to its ambition, while Taiwan can expect backing from the US and Japan, each acting in its own interest.

The east coast. If the PLAN tried to land east of Taiwan, it would meet mountain ranges running into the centre of the island. Even a successful landing would invite guerrilla warfare, in which the local population holds the advantage, and clearing the terrain could take years.

The north. Near Taipei, shallow water makes submarine operations difficult. A force that did dock would face Hsiung Feng III anti-ship cruise missiles, mobile coastal defence batteries, sea mines and an asymmetric doctrine designed to make the crossing lethal. Survivors would then face urban warfare.

Demopolitik: a democracy that will resist

In Taiwan’s early years, leaders such as Mao might have won over its people. Decades on, Taiwan functions as a democracy, and its citizens would naturally resist rule by an authoritarian state.

Urban warfare means fighting house to house, which is slow and dangerous. Troops and civilians would be in constant conflict, and normal daily life would become nearly impossible. Semiconductors, EVs, AI and consumer electronics would suffer for years, producing a prolonged war that disrupts the global economy much as Russia’s invasion of Ukraine did. The world cannot afford it.

Only a fool would plan an amphibious operation in present conditions.

Ekopolitik: the silicon shield

Taiwan makes the large majority of the world’s advanced semiconductor chips, which both the US and China need. This “silicon shield” deters Beijing: in a world moving towards AI and EVs, disrupting that supply chain would be self-destruction.

Chips are only the start. The Taiwan Strait carries roughly 20% of global maritime trade and a large share of the world’s container fleet, with an estimated $2.45 trillion of trade passing through each year. Relocating the semiconductor industry would cost billions of dollars and take 3 to 4 years, and the damage to the electronics market would be on the scale of a modern-day great depression.

Experience: an untested military

China has not fought a war in decades. Scaring smaller nations is one thing; a full-scale war is another. Its self-described next-generation weapons have never been battle-tested, and entering a war that could cost it the superpower status it is heading towards would be a costly mistake.

The Soviet Union is the warning. Its war in Afghanistan drained resources, sent soldiers home in coffins and pushed defence spending ever higher, and it lost the Cold War and its superpower status. A country worth living in needs many boxes ticked, and military strength is only one of them.

Conclusion

Will China abandon the dream of Rejuvenation? It is too early to say. But Beijing has not tied itself to 2049 as a hard deadline, and it can keep extending the timeline until it becomes the undisputed superpower it aspires to be.

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