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Geopolitical Flashpoint: US-Venezuela Tensions, China’s Strategic Support, and Implications for Caribbean Stability

-By Animesh Pratap Singh

In mid-2025, the United States deployed warships, including the USS Jason Dunham, USS Gravely, USS Sampson, and USS Lake Erie, to the Caribbean Sea near Venezuelan waters. Washington framed the buildup as part of counter-narcotics operations targeting Venezuelan-linked cartels such as Tren de Aragua. The move coincided with mounting disputes over Venezuela’s 2024 presidential election, which the US labeled fraudulent, rejecting Nicolás Maduro’s contested victory.

Tensions spiked on September 3, 2025, when a US strike sank a Venezuelan vessel allegedly carrying drugs, killing 11. Venezuelan F-16 jets buzzed the USS Jason Dunham on September 4–5, prompting Washington to deploy ten F-35 stealth fighters to Puerto Rico. President Trump warned Caracas that “dangerous maneuvers” would result in Venezuelan aircraft being shot down, reiterating allegations that Maduro’s government is tied to drug trafficking—charges Venezuela denies.

Maduro responded by mobilizing 8 million citizens, including 4 million Bolivarian Militia members, for potential military duty. While threatening “armed struggle,” he also called for dialogue, arguing disputes with the US did not justify open conflict.

China, in sharp contrast to Washington, condemned the US military buildup as “foreign interference.” During a WWII commemoration, Maduro hailed Beijing as “the first military power on planet Earth,” underscoring growing alignment. In May 2025, China granted Venezuela a $5 billion loan for oil production, and speculation swirls that Beijing could supply drones or missiles, raising the specter of a proxy war.

Historical Background and Venezuela-China Treaties

Diplomatic ties between Venezuela and China date back to 1944 but deepened after 1974, when Caracas recognized the People’s Republic of China over Taiwan. Relations accelerated under Hugo Chávez (1999–2013), who forged a “strategic development partnership” in 2001—the first of its kind with a Hispanic country. Maduro upgraded this to an “all-weather strategic partnership” in 2014.

Since 1999, the two countries have signed more than 600 agreements spanning energy, infrastructure, defense, and technology, all geared toward reducing US influence in Latin America. Venezuela joined China’s Belt and Road Initiative in 2018, embedding itself in Beijing’s global infrastructure strategy.

Key Agreements (Highlights):

Why China Supports Venezuela Despite US Sanctions?

Beijing’s continued support for Venezuela rests on intertwined economic, strategic, and ideological factors:

Through BRICS+ mechanisms, China helps Venezuela skirt Western restrictions.

Two additional global shifts embolden Beijing’s stance:

  1. Industrial Capacity Achilles Heel of the West:

The Ukraine and Palestine conflicts have exposed the West’s strained weapons stockpiles and sluggish industrial capacity. This vulnerability reassures China that it can openly support Venezuela without facing overwhelming Western escalation capacity.

  1. BRICS+ Sanction Resilience: 

With the BRICS+ framework expanding financial, trade, and energy networks beyond the dollar, Western sanctions are increasingly blunted. Beijing can argue that US attempts to isolate Venezuela only highlight Washington’s overreach—especially after US “clownish rants” against India, which Beijing seizes on to portray the West as dictatorial and domineering toward sovereign nations.

Future Possibilities for Regional Peace

The Caribbean now faces elevated risks of escalation, with ripple effects on regional stability:

Hypothetical US Attack: Population and Geography Impacts

Venezuela’s 29 million people are heavily urbanized, concentrated in Caracas, Maracaibo, and other coastal hubs. Its rugged Andes, vast rainforests, and oil-rich Orinoco Basin favor protracted guerrilla resistance.

A US strike would likely involve naval and aerial campaigns targeting military sites, PDVSA oil facilities, and command centers. Ground invasion risks prolonged urban warfare, civilian casualties in the millions, and further refugee crises—adding to the 7.7 million Venezuelans already displaced. Environmental disaster from sabotage of oilfields or Caribbean oil spills could cripple global supply chains.

Any such war would not remain confined: Cuba, Russia, and China could all be drawn in, potentially internationalizing the conflict and destabilizing the wider Caribbean basin.

Conclusion

The unfolding US–Venezuela confrontation in 2025 illustrates how localized disputes are increasingly embedded within global power transitions. While Washington frames its actions in terms of counter-narcotics and democratic legitimacy, Caracas—backed by Beijing—presents the crisis as a struggle for sovereignty against external interference. China’s continued engagement, rooted in oil-for-loan mechanisms, strategic partnerships, and anti-hegemonic discourse, reflects both pragmatic economic interests and broader efforts to recalibrate the global order toward multipolarity.

Importantly, the episode underscores two structural shifts: first, the exposure of Western industrial limitations in sustaining simultaneous conflicts, as revealed in Ukraine and Palestine, has altered strategic calculations; and second, the BRICS+ framework offers states like Venezuela alternative avenues to mitigate the coercive reach of Western sanctions. Together, these dynamics create conditions in which China perceives lower risks and higher rewards in supporting Venezuela, even at the expense of escalating tensions with the United States.

Nevertheless, the prospect of direct great-power conflict in the Caribbean remains low. Historical experience, economic interdependence, and the high costs of intervention constrain escalation. The greater danger lies in proxy dynamics, regional instability, and oil market disruptions, which could ripple across the global economy. Ultimately, the crisis serves as a barometer for the evolving balance of power: whether the United States can preserve its traditional sphere of influence in the Americas, or whether China, leveraging strategic partnerships and institutional alternatives, can erode the US-led order without resorting to overt confrontation.

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